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Abstract
In the classical multi-party computation setting,
multiple parties jointly compute a function with-
out revealing their own input data. We consider a
variant of this problem, where the input data can
be shared for machine learning training purposes,
but the data are also encrypted so that they can-
not be recovered by other parties. We present a
rotation based method using flow model, and theo-
retically justified its security. We demonstrate the
effectiveness of our method in different scenar-
ios, including supervised secure model training,
and unsupervised generative model training. Our
code is available at https://github.com/
duchenzhuang/flowencrypt.
1. Introduction
Data and model are the two most important factors in ma-
chine learning. Unfortunately, sometimes no one has both
of them, so multiple parties have to collaborate together to
solve certain problems. For the data providers, such col-
laboration can be risky: once the data is sent to the other
parties, they may later sell or use the data without getting
permissions from the data providers. This risk is becoming
larger in recent years due to the larger volume of data owned
by the providers.
Multi-party computation (MPC) (Yao, 1982; 1986; Goldre-
ich et al., 1987; Chaum et al., 1988; Ben-Or et al., 1988;
Bogetoft et al., 2009) is specifically designed for such sce-
narios. With rigorous theoretical guarantees, it provides one
way to let multiple parties jointly compute any function and
also keep each party’s data private. However, this general
framework comes with a price: the computational overhead
of MPC is so high that currently it cannot yet support large
scale computational task like neural network training.
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We consider a variant of this problem, where instead of re-
quiring the data to be completely private so that no one gets
any information about it, we only require data to be partially
private. That is, no one can efficiently recover the original
data, but users can extract other useful information from the
encrypted data. Although being different, our requirement
has the flavor of differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006),
e.g., users can obtain the average salary of all employees,
but cannot figure out the salary of each individual.
Let us start with the following scenario: as a data provider,
we want to hire a machine learning (ML) factory to train
a model for us. However, we do not trust the ML factory,
and do not want it to sell the data or the trained model
to the third party. Therefore, our encrypted data must be
secure in the sense that no one can decrypt it. Moreover, the
encrypted data can be used for machine learning training,
but the trained model is only useful to the data providers
with the secret encryption key, and is useless to the other
parties. See Figure 1 for illustration.
To ensure security of the encryption method, we assume
that the adversary is very powerful, i.e., it has unlimited
computational power, and also knows exactly the underlying
distribution of our input data (See Definition 3 for the formal
definition). Hence, an ideal encryption method in this setting
should at least satisfy three properties:
• Security: Any adversary with the encrypted data, the
distribution of the original input data, and unlimited
computational power cannot decrypt our encrypted
data.
• Integrity: The encrypted data contain enough informa-
tion for machine learning training purposes, compared
with the original data.
• Specificity: The models trained using the encrypted
data only work for the encrypted test data, and cannot
be directly applied to the original test data.
Using flow-based generative models (Dinh et al., 2014;
2016; Kingma & Dhariwal, 2018), we propose an encryption
method that satisfies these three properties with theoretical
guarantees. Flow models are bijective functions that map
the input data distribution into a Gaussian-like distribution,
which we call the feature distribution. In our encryption
method, we first privately sample a orthogonal matrix, and
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Figure 1. Illustration of the supervised secure model training scenario. The data provider wants to encrypt its private data so that the ML
factory can use it to train a model, but the model can only be used by the data provider with the secret encryption key. Moreover, the data
cannot be decrypted, so the ML factory cannot sell the data or the model to the third party.
Figure 2. Illustration of our encrytion method. We first use a flow
model to map the input data into the feature space, and then apply
a private orthogonal transformation to the feature, and finally use
the flow model to convert the encrypted feature back into the input
space.
use it to apply an orthogonal transformation to the features
of the input. After the transformation, we use the bijective
flow model to convert the encrypted features back into the
input space. See Figure 2 for illustration. The security of
the encryption is ensured because the orthogonal matrix is
private and cannot be recovered, as we will prove in Sec-
tion 4.
Our encryption method is a general gadget that can be used
in many different scenarios, not limited to the setting in
Figure 1. For example, other parties may want to train
a generative model based on our private data, but we do
not want to share the data with them. As another example,
when multiple parties are training a machine learning model
together, they may face the data leakage problem when
reporting the gradient during the training (Zhu et al., 2019).
Our encryption method can be applied to both scenarios
for making the private data secure. We will present more
details about various applications of our encryption method
in Section 5, as well as experimental results in Section 6. To
our best knowledge, we are the first to encrypt data using
invertible generative models. We hope that our method will
serve as a useful building block for data sharing and ML
algorithm design in the future.
2. Related Work
Multi-party computation (MPC) (Yao, 1982; 1986; Goldre-
ich et al., 1987; Chaum et al., 1988; Ben-Or et al., 1988;
Bogetoft et al., 2009) is a very powerful framework in the
sense that it will keep all the input data private. Some of the
results in MPC have been applied to the training process of
neural networks: Zhang et al. (2015); Li et al. (2017); Aono
et al. (2017) used homomorphic encryption to encrypt the
training for neural networks, and Mohassel & Zhang (2017);
Riazi et al. (2018) developed new protocols for training neu-
ral networks in a 2PC setting. However, as we mentioned
before, MPC-based protocols have huge computational over-
head during the encryption/decryption process and people
can only afford to train small networks on small datasets, so
they are not yet practical in deep learning training.
There are also papers that use differential privacy (Dwork
et al., 2014) to preserve the data privacy during the training.
These works only care about the privacy of the data, so the
learned models can be directly applied to the original data
distribution. Abadi et al. (2016) added noise in the training
to ensure differential privacy for the neural networks, Vaidya
et al. (2013) used Naive Bayes to handle the case when there
is only one data provider, and Li et al. (2018) extended that
to the multiple-data-provider case.
Deep Generative models are useful tools of learning data
distribution and generating new data. There are several
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kinds of deep generative models, e.g., Gerative Adversar-
ial Networks (Goodfellow et al., 2014), Variational Auto-
Encoders (Kingma & Welling, 2013), auto-regressive mod-
els (Oord et al., 2016), and flow-based generators (Kingma
& Dhariwal, 2018). Among these, we use flow-based mod-
els because it is reversible. Flow-based generative mod-
els learn the data distribution mainly by warping Gaussian
distribution and minimizing the log likelihood. To speed
up the computation, people have taken several approaches,
including using affine transformations (Dinh et al., 2014;
2016; Kingma & Dhariwal, 2018), combining with auto-
regressive methods (Kingma et al., 2016), and normalizing
flows (Rezende & Mohamed, 2015).
Recently, Huang et al. proposes InstaHide, which also aims
to encrypt the private data while preserving the learnability
to neural networks. They mixes private labeled images with
public unlabeled images and applies a random sign-flip on
the pixels to produce encrypted images which look like
random noise. Our method, however, is invertible and hence
guaranteed to preserve all the information of the original
data.
3. Preliminaries
We use D to denote the underlying distribution of the input
data points. Assume that our private data set contains n data
points {si}ni=1 ∼ D, where si ∈ Rm. We want to construct
a mapping Enc : Rm → Rm for the data encryption. In
this paper, we assume the data points are images. This is
without loss of generality, because our approach can easily
generalize to other kinds of data.
3.1. Total variation distance
We use the following metric for measuring the distance
between two distributions.
Definition 1 (Total variation distance). For two distribu-
tions P and Q defined on domain D, we define the total
variation distance as
δ(P,Q) , sup
A∈D
|P (A)−Q(A)| (1)
For the total variation distance, we later need the following
lemma that effectively removes the factor n in the exponent.
Lemma 1 ((Hoeffding & Wolfowitz, 1958), Eq.(4.5)). For
two distributions P and Q, any integer n ≥ 1, the following
inequalities hold:
δ(Pn, Qn) ≤ 1− (1− δ(P,Q))n ≤ nδ(P,Q). (2)
3.2. Flow model
Flow-based generative models (Dinh et al., 2014; 2016;
Kingma & Dhariwal, 2018), or simply flow models, are one
kind of generative models. They assume that the data can be
converted into a feature space by a bijective function f . That
is, given any input x ∈ Rm, there exists a corresponding
latent variable z ∈ Rm, such that z = f(x), and x =
f−1(z). Moreover, the latent variables follow some simple
distributions, e.g., multivariate Gaussian distribution.
In other words, flow models can effectively convert the
original data distribution (which does not have analytical
form) into much simpler distributions like Gaussian distri-
bution, and this mapping is invertible. There are many good
flow models, and in this paper we mainly use the Glow
model (Kingma & Dhariwal, 2018). We remark that if bet-
ter flow models are proposed in the future, they can also be
applied in our setting to improve the empirical performance
of the encryption.
3.3. Encryption Algorithm
Our encryption algorithm is sketched in Algorithm 1. Over-
all speaking, given the private data, we first train a flow
model f , which learns a bijection between the input space
and the feature space. After that, we map each original
image to a feature, “rotate” that feature using a uniformly-
sampled orthogonal matrix, and then “recover” the rotated
feature into a new image, which is the encryption of the
original image.
Algorithm 1 Encryption of Private Image Data
Input: Original images {si}ni=1, each of size m
Train a flow model f using {si}ni=1
Sample A uniformly from all m×m orthogonal matrices
for i = 1 to n do
xi = f(si)
xˆi = Axi
Enc(si) = f
−1(xˆi)
end for
Although being extremely simple, Algorithm 1 has many
nice properties, as we will see in Section 4 and Section 5.
Based on the encryption algorithm, we can define various
feature distributions.
Definition 2 (Feature distributions). We define Gg to be the
distribution of the features xi, and H0 , N (0, Im) is the
standard normal distribution. Also, define H1 to be the
distribution of rotated features xˆi.
3.4. Adversary and orthogonal matrix
Below we formally define the power of our adversary.
Definition 3 (Strong Adversary). An adversary is called
strong if it knows the encryption algorithm (except the pri-
vate orthogonal matrix A), the encrypted data, the under-
lying distribution D of the original input data, and has
unlimited computational power.
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This kind of adversary is very strong in the sense that it not
only knows the encrypted data, but also have total informa-
tion about the underlying distribution of the input. Besides,
it can even use the flow model f in our encryption algorithm.
The goal of this adversary is to recover the orthogonal ma-
trix A from these information. To formally define the notion
of successful recovery, we first need to define volume and
ball in the space of orthogonal matrices.
Definition 4 (Normalized volume). Let U be the set of all
orthogonal matrices with size m×m, and let T be a subset
of U . Define the normalized volume of T be
v(T ) , P[A ∈ T ], (3)
where A is sampled uniformly from all m×m orthogonal
matrices.
Definition 5 ((θ,A)-ball). LetU be the set of all orthogonal
matrices with size m × m. Given an orthogonal matrix
A ∈ Rm×m, δ > 0, the ball centered at A with radius δ is
defined as
Bδ(A) , {M |‖M −A‖F ≤ δ,M ∈ U}. (4)
Given any θ ∈ (0, 1], let δ∗ , min{δ|v(Bδ(A)) ≥ θ}. We
define (θ,A)-ball as Bδ∗(A).
Essentially, we use Frobenius norm to define a ball centered
at matrix A with normalized volume θ. Here Frobenius
norm is picked for convenience, and our analysis can be
applied to other metrics as well. Now we can define whether
a recovery is successful.
Definition 6 (successful recovery with tolerance θ). A re-
covery of matrixA by an adversary is a successful recovery
with tolerance θ if the output A˜ of the adversary is within
the (θ,A)-ball.
In other words, if the output A˜ is close to A in terms of
Frobenius norm, we say the recovery is successful.
4. Main Theorem
In this section, we will first present the main theorem, and
then give the proof for the simple case and the general case
in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2, respectively.
Theorem 1 (Main Theorem). The success probability of
any strong adversary trying to recover A with tolerance θ
cannot exceed δ(Hn0 ,Hn1 ) + θ.
Our main theorem gives an upper bound of the success
probability of any strong adversary that tries to recover
matrix A. This upper bound has two terms, the θ term and
the total variation term, which we elaborate below.
The θ term is completely controlled by the data provider. For
example, if θ = 0.5, that means we define the recovery to
be successful if the adversary can find an orthogonal matrix
that is closer to A compared with at least half of all possible
orthogonal matrices. In this case, the adversary can simply
do a random guess to get 0.5 success probability. Indeed, the
θ term is inevitable, because adversary can always randomly
sample matrix that is in (θ,A)-ball with probability θ.
The total variation term measures the distance between the
feature distribution and the Gaussian distribution. Intu-
itively, the Gaussian distribution is the most difficult case
for the adversary because it is rotation-invariant. In other
words, before and after applying the orthogonal transforma-
tion, the data look the same to the adversary, which makes
the recovery of the exact A impossible. Therefore we have
this term in the upper bound, indicating that if the distance
to the Gaussian distribution is smaller, it will be harder to
decrypt the matrix A. In practice, a better flow model will
make this distance smaller.
Using Lemma 1, we immediately get the following corollary,
which removes the exponent n in the upper bound.
Corollary 1. The success probability of any adversary
trying to recover A with tolerance θ cannot exceed
nδ(H0,H1) + θ.
4.1. Proof of the simple case
Let’s start the proof with a simple example where
δ(H0,H1) = 0, i.e., the distribution Gg is exactly equal to
standard normal distribution. In this case, δ(Hn0 ,Hn1 ) = 0,
so our main theorem can be simplified to the following
lemma.
Lemma 2. If Gg = H0 , N (0, Im), then the success prob-
ability of any adversary trying to recover A with tolerance
θ cannot exceed θ.
Proof. If Gg = N (0, Im), i.e., ∀i ∈ [n], xi ∼ N (0, Im),
we can compute the distribution of xˆi:
E[xˆi] = AE[xi] = A · 0 = 0. (5)
V ar(xˆi) = A · V ar(xi)A> = AA> = Im. (6)
Note that the distribution of xˆi is still a Gaussian distribution,
and it has the same expectation and variance as xi. Thus,
H0 = H1. (7)
Therefore, for all orthogonal matrix A, the distribution of
Enc(si) are the same, i.e., A is independent of the distri-
bution of the encrypted images. This means that given the
encrypted images, any output from the adversary is equiva-
lent to a random guess over all orthogonal matrices. From
the definition of tolerance, we know that the success proba-
bility of any adversary trying to recover A with tolerance θ
cannot exceed θ.
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This lemma tells us that if the distribution of the features
is exactly standard normal distribution, i.e., the first term
in the upper bound is 0, then the only possibility that the
adversary can succeed is that the random guess is within the
tolerance. In the next part, we will provide a formal proof
for the general case, i.e., our main theorem.
4.2. Proof of the general case
In this part, we will show the proof of our main theorem,
which is a generalization of the proof for Lemma 2.
We first provide the intuition of this proof: What the adver-
sary can observe is only the encrypted data, which can be
considered as some samples of the distribution of Enc(si).
From the proof of Lemma 2 we know that if Gg = N (0, Im),
the adversary will output a random guess of matrix A. Thus,
given n samples of the encrypted data distribution, if the
adversary cannot distinguish between H1 and H0, it will
be impossible for him to do better than random guess in
recovering matrix A.
Let us formalize this intuition into a full proof:
Proof of Theorem 1. Firstly, we restrict this problem in fea-
ture space: The data-to-feature map (flow model) is a bi-
jection and known to the adversary, and the adversary has
unlimited computational power. Thus, given any data or
distribution in the image space, the adversary can map it to
the feature space using the data-to-feature map, and vice
versa. Therefore, it suffices to only consider the data and
distributions in the feature space.
We will prove that if we can recover the matrix A with high
probability, then we can distinguish very similar distribu-
tions with high probability, which is impossible. Below we
first formally define the two related problems, and then we
will do a recursion between them.
Problem 1 (distinguishing distributions): Given the
Gaussian distributionH0 = N (0, Im), feature distribution
Gg , rotated feature distributionH1, and matrix A uniformly
sampled from the set of all orthogonal matrices. Sample
a bit b uniformly from {0, 1} (this bit is hidden from the
solver), and take n i.i.d. samples {xi}ni=1 ∼ Hnb . We want
to find b.
Problem 2 (recovering matrix A): Given a feature dis-
tribution Gg, and samples of rotated features {xˆi}ni=1 ∼
(H1)n and the we want to recover the rotation matrix A.
For a strong oracle O2 for Problem 2, assume that its suc-
cess probability is p. Note that this success probability is
the expectation taken over the samples {xˆi}ni=1, the choice
of orthogonal matrix A, and the randomness of O2 itself.
We remark that O2 can also take Gg and {xˆi}ni=1 ∼ (H0)n
as the input because the input shape matches. However,
since Problem 2 expects xˆi to be sampled from H1, if
we use H0 instead, O2 may generate unexpected outputs
without any guarantees on the success probability.
We now use this strong oracle O2 to construct an oracle O1
for Problem 1: Let
O1 = 1success[O2(Gg, x1, · · · , xn)], (8)
In other words, O1 first assumes b = 1, and then calls O2
with the feature distribution and the n samples, receive the
output matrix A˜ of O2. O1 outputs 1 if A˜ is a successful
recovery with tolerance θ to A, and 0 otherwise.
Define the success probability of O1 be the expected proba-
bility of returning the correct bit b, where the expectation is
taken over the randomness of bit b and the oracle O2.
When b = 0, i.e., the samples come from the Gaussian
distribution, from the proof of Lemma 2 we know that no
algorithm can get any information about A, i.e., the output
ofO2 is independent withA. SinceA is a randomly sampled
orthogonal matrix, we know that when b = 0, the success
probability of O1(i.e., the probability of outputting 0) is
1− θ.
When b = 1, we know that its success probability is equal
to the success probability of O2, which is p. Therefore,
the overall success probability of O1 is
(1−θ)+p
2 , as b is
uniformly sampled from {0, 1}.
However, from the Bayes risk of binary hypothesis
test (Wainwright, 2019), we know that the maximum suc-
cess probability for Problem 1 is 1+δ(H
n
0 ,Hn1 )
2 .
Thus,
(1− θ) + p
2
≤ 1 + δ(H
n
0 ,Hn1 )
2
, (9)
i.e.,
p ≤ δ(Hn0 ,Hn1 ) + θ. (10)
5. Applications
In this section we discuss various applications of our encryp-
tion method. We believe that this method can serve as an
important building block for protecting privacy in machine
learning.
5.1. Supervised secure model training
Our first example is the setting described in Figure 1. To
solve this problem, we may directly apply our Algorithm 1
to each class of images. That is, assuming that there are N
classes, we train a flow model fi for the i-th class. In the
dataset, for each pair of data points (x, y), we encrypt x to
get xˆ using fy, and send (xˆ, y) to the ML factory. Notice
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that we cannot train a simple flow model for all classes
because after the whole dataset encryption using a single
model, the input-label correspondence might be lost, but
independent encryption for each class does not have this
problem.
This solution satisfies the three properties that we required:
Security, Integrity and Specificity. The Security property
holds because the ML factory cannot decrypt the orthogonal
matrix for each class, as we shown in Theorem 1. Therefore,
it cannot recover the original data points.
The Integrity property holds because we apply orthogonal
transformation in the feature space, which has semantic
meanings. After the transformation, the encrypted features
follow a similar Gaussian-like distribution, so they still con-
tain enough information for machine learning training pur-
poses. We will further empirically demonstrate this property
in our experiments.
We verify the Specificity property of our method by running
simulations, as we will see in Section 6.1. That is, after
being trained on the encrypted data, the model does not have
good prediction accuracy on the original data distribution.
In order to apply the model, one needs to first encrypt the
data using the secret orthogonal matrix A. In other words,
only the data provider can use the trained model.
5.2. Unsupervised generative model training
Consider the scenario that the ML factory wants to learn
a generative model using the private unlabeled data from
the data provider. The data provider agrees to let ML fac-
tory train the model, but does not want it to see the private
dataset. In this case, we can apply our Algorithm 1 to en-
crypt the data, and ask the ML factory to train the generative
model using the encrypted data. The intuition is, after the or-
thogonal transformation in the feature space, the encrypted
data still contain enough semantic information for the data
distribution (the Integrity property).
As we demonstrate in Section 6.2, this solution works well,
and the encrypted data can indeed be used for training a
very good generative model.
5.3. Data leakage with gradients
In this scenario, multiple agents collaborate together to train
a model, and each agent has its own private data. As argued
by Zhu et al. (2019), each agent faces the problem of data
leakage when sharing the gradients with the other agents.
Specifically, for the synchronous distributed training, in t-th
iteration , agent i samples a minibatch (xt,i, yt,i) to compute
the gradients∇Wt,i
∇Wt,i = ∂`(F (xt,i,Wt), yt,i)
∂Wt
(11)
where ` is the loss function, F is the neural network function,
and Wt is the synchronized weight for the network at the
iteration t. Then the gradients are averaged across the N
agents, so the weight Wt is updated as:
Wt+1 =Wt − η 1
N
N∑
j=1
∇Wt,j (12)
The data leakage happens if an adversary has the informa-
tion of the gradients, model architecture and weights. In
this case, the input data can be recovered by minimizing
the distance between the actual gradients and gradients ob-
tained from the randomly initialized dummy input x′ and
label y′ (Zhu et al., 2019), where the optimization is applied
to x′ and y′. The gradient from x′ and y′ is defined as
∇W ′ = ∂`(F (x
′,W ), y′)
∂W
(13)
Our encryption can help avoid data leakage under the as-
sumption that all the agents can be trusted, and they share
the common private orthogonal matrices for each class of
data. In this setting, all the data points can be encrypted, and
the adversary will not be able to learn the private data from
the gradients without knowing the orthogonal matrices. As
we will show in Section 6.3, the adversary can only recovery
the encrypted data using the gradients.
(a) Original Image
(b) Encrypted Image
Figure 3. Visualization of the images before and after encryp-
tion. The first row contains original images and the second row
contains the corresponding encrypted images.
6. Experiments
In this section, we present the experimental results of our
method for different scenarios discussed in Section 5: su-
pervised secure model training (Section 6.1), unsupervised
generative model training (Section 6.2) and data leakage
with gradients (Section 6.3). We use PyTorch (Paszke et al.,
2019) for all the experiments.
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Glow Model (Kingma & Dhariwal, 2018). We use Glow
model in our experiments. Glow model can learn distribu-
tion on unbounded space, but the data have bounded interval
range. To reduce the impact of boundary effects, we model
the density as logit(α+ (1− α)⊙x/256) following (Dinh
et al., 2016). In our implementation, we use activation nor-
malization as our normalization method, which is a scale
and bias layer with data dependent initialization. For per-
mutation, we use an (learned) invertible 1 × 1 convolution,
where the weight matrix is initialized as a random rotation
matrix. Also, we use the Affine coupling layer instead of
the Additive coupling layer. We set #levels to 3, steps to 16,
learning rate to 0.001 and batch size to 512.
We visualize some figures before and after the encryption
in Figure 3. As we can see, original images and their cor-
responding encrypted images visually belong to the same
class. This shows that the Glow model can indeed capture
the semantic meanings of the inputs.
6.1. Supervised secure model training
In this subsection, we run experiments on CIFAR10 and
LSUN with Glow and classifiers including ResNet (He et al.,
2016) and DenseNet (Huang et al., 2017).
Table 1. Test accuracy of different models on different
datasets. There shows the test accuracy of different models on
different datasets to validate the effectiveness of our method on
supervised learning.
Neural Network
TrainSet TestSet ResNet50 DenseNet121
Original
CIFAR
Ori-CIFAR 95.51 95.54
Enc-CIFAR 44.49 45.83
Encrypted
CIFAR
Ori-CIFAR 33.69 38.45
Enc-CIFAR 88.53 88.73
Original
LSUN
Ori-LSUN 84.86 85.99
Enc-LSUN 69.00 69.77
Encrypted
LSUN(1)
Ori-LSUN 55.83 58.33
Enc-LSUN 92.31 93.21
Encrypted
LSUN(2)
Ori-LSUN 25.53 30.10
Enc-LSUN 77.96 78.69
Experiment Details. We train our model on two natural
image datasets: CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky et al., 2009) and
LSUN (Yu et al., 2015). For every dataset, we train a sepa-
rate Glow model for each individual class. Every CIFAR-10
class has 5, 000 data points, while LSUN is much larger.
Except 126, 227 data points for the class of outdoor church
and 168, 103 data points for the class of classroom, we use
randomly sampled 150, 000 data points for all other classes
to train Glow models. We call this case LSUN(1). We also
tried another experiment where each Glow model uses only
5, 000 data points for training, which is called LSUN(2).
Essentially, in the first setting, the encryption method uses a
more powerful Glow model trained with more data points.
All the images are resized to 32∗32 and all Glow models are
using the same hyper parameters as mentioned above. For
LSUN, we sampled 60, 000 data points for model training
(50, 000) and testing (10, 000). As we proved in Theorem 1,
our encryption method is secure. Therefore, it remains to
see whether it also has the Integrity and Specificity property,
which we elaborate below.
Integrity. In Table 1, we present the experimental results
of different models on different datasets. As we can see,
after being trained on the encrypted data, both ResNet and
DenseNet can achieve very good accuracy on the encrypted
test data, i.e., 88% for CIFAR-10, and 92% − 93% for
LSUN(1). It is worth pointing out that the test accuracy
for the encrypted case is not as high as the accuracy for the
original case for CIFAR-10. We believe that this is because
CIFAR-10 is a small dataset, and cannot be used for training
good Glow models. By contrast, in LSUN(1), when we use
very large dataset to train the Glow models, the accuracy
is increased significantly, even more than the accuracy in
the original case. This is because the original case does
not have the extra information from Glow models, and only
relies on the information from the 50, 000 training data. As
a result, in LSUN(2), when the Glow models are trained
using 5, 000 data points each, the accuracy in the encrypted
case dramatically decreased. Hence, when well trained flow
models are available, the Integrity property can be ensured
in practice.
Specificity. In Table 1, when the models are trained using
encrypted datasets, they will have good accuracy on en-
crypted test data, but bad accuracy on the original test data.
In other words, the trained model can only be used by the
data provider who knows how to encrypt data, and cannot
be used by other parties.
Table 2. Comparing the Glows based on BPDs. In the table be-
low, we present the BPDs of CIFAR-10 and ImageNet calculated
by the two glows where the first glow is trained on the original
CIFAR and the second glow is trained on the encrypted CIFAR.
Glows-Similarity CIFAR-10 ImageNet
Glow-original 3.49 3.76
Glow-encrypted 3.67 3.93
Glow-untrained 9.75 9.66
6.2. Unsupervised generative model training
In this subsection, we present experimental results for the
unsupervised generative model training described in Sec-
tion 5.2. We hope that the generative model trained on the
encrypted data is as good as the one trained on the original
data. For simplicity, we also use Glow as the generative
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model for training. But in practice, one can also use the
encrypted data to train GANs or VAEs. Below we show
both quantitative and qualitative experimental evaluations.
(a) Original Image
(b) Images Reversed by The Second Glow
Figure 4. Comparing the two Glows trained on original data
and encrypted data. The first row are original CIFAR-10 images.
We extract their features by the glow trained on original CIFAR-10
images, and reverse the features by the glow trained on encrypted
CIFAR-10 images to get the second row’s images.
Quantitative Evaluations. For quantitative evaluations,
we use Bit per dimension (BPD) to evaluate the similarity.
BPD is defined as the negative log likelihood (with base 2)
divided by the number of pixels.
In this experiment, we train Glow models in both original
dataset and encrypted dataset. Notice that the models are
trained using data points from all classes. The results are
shown in Table 2. As we can see, the BPDs of both original
dataset and enrypted dataset are close, for both CIFAR-10
and ImageNet. By contrast, the BPDs for Glows without any
training (i.e., at its random initialization) are much larger.
In other words, from the BPD perspective, the Glow models
trained on original and encrypted datasets are similar.
Qualitative Experiments. In this experiment, we train two
Glow models, on the original CIFAR-10 and the encrypted
CIFAR-10 datasets, respectively. We then first extract the
feature of a given original image using the first model, and
then use the second model to recover the original image.
See Figure 4 for the final results.
Although they are not exactly the same (because the two
Glow models are different), we can tell that they are visually
similar to each other. We believe that this shows the two
models contain lots of common information. Since our
encryption method ensures the security of the training data,
it is a good way to let others to train generative models
without sharing the training data.
6.3. Data leakage with gradients
In this subsection, we run experiments for data leakage with
gradients, as discussed in Section 5.3.
Experimental Setup. Our experimental settings are gener-
ally following Zhu et al. (2019). We use L-BFGS(Liu &
Nocedal, 1989) as our optimizer with learning rate 1. We set
Table 3. Classification Results on Leaked encrypted CIFAR-
10. We steal the encrypted CIFAR-10 images from gradients and
use the leaked images to train classifiers. This table shows the test
accuracies.
CIFAR-10 Original Test Encrypted Test
ResNet50 9.49 42.97
DenseNet121 10.3 39.11
Table 4. Classification Results on Leaked encrypted LSUN(1).
We steal the encrypted LSUN(1) images from gradients and use the
leaked images to train classifiers. This table shows the accuracies.
LSUN-Sampled Original Test Encrypted Test
ResNet50 46.39 59.40
DenseNet121 44.79 51.35
batch size 1 and iteration 100 for every image. To meet the
requirements that the model needs to be twice-differentiable,
we replace activation ReLU to Sigmoid and remove strides.
For the labels, we randomly initialize a continuous vec-
tor instead of directly optimizing the discrete vector. For
the inputs, we randomly initialize a continuous vector with
Shape N × C × H ×W . Here the C = 3, N = 1 and
H = W = 32. For convenience, all the experiments are
using randomly initialized weights. We apply the method
described in Section 5.3, i.e., all the agents will share the
same secret orthogonal matrices, and use those matrices for
data encryption.
Experimental Results. In Figure 5, We show the leaked
images using gradient information. The recovery of the en-
crypted image is successful, but as we proved in Theorem 1,
the adversary cannot further recovery the original image
from the encrypted image.
We also steal all the encrypted images using the gradient
information for both CIFAR-10 and LSUN(1) datasets, and
use those images for training. See Table 3 and Table 4 for
details. We can see that the trained model has very bad
accuracies on the original test data, and slightly higher test
accuracy on the encrypted test data.
To sum up, leaking data from gradients can only get the
encrypted data, so our encryption keeps the private data
safe. Moreover, from our experimental results, the accu-
racy of model trained on leaked data does not work on the
(a) Original Image (b) Encrypted Image (c) Leaked Image
Figure 5. Visualization result of original data, encrypted data and
leaked data.
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original test data, therefore is useless to the adversary for
classification tasks.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a data encryption algorithm for
theoretically ensuring the privacy while preserving useful
information from the data. Our method is a building block
which can be applied in many scenarios in machine learning.
We give theoretically guarantees for the security of our
encrypted algorithm, and our experiments demonstrated
that our methods are useful in real datasets like LSUN and
CIFAR-10. For the future work, we hope to apply our
method to other interesting problems.
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